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Exercise can cut desire for high-kilojoule foods

Physical activity is promoted for its benefit on fitness and helping burn up excess kilojoules. Now scientists are beginning to unravel secondary benefits it could have by dampening activation of brain regions that drive our desire for less-healthy high-kilojoule foods.

Physical activity has many health benefits and is a cornerstone of lifestyle advice to help with weight control. Being more active can cause a short-term increases in hunger soon after exercising, but longer-term it results in less hunger and of course more kilojoules burned.

Scientist have been probing into the brain to examine just how exercise could have direct effects on appetite and feelings of hunger. One interesting theory is that regular exercise may curb the activity of brain reward regions that light up and drive desire when we see food – especially the high kilojoule sweet and fatty variety.

Speak softly and don't stuff up: Bob Carr's legacy

As was widely anticipated, former foreign minister Bob Carr has resigned from the Senate, opening the way for the appointment of a new Labor Senator in New South Wales. In announcing his resignation, Carr described his period as foreign minister as being the learning equivalent of "a dozen PhDs" and an exercise in continuity.

In a year-and-a-half as foreign minister, Carr took a "steady as she goes" approach to running Australia’s foreign relations. He term was very much a matter of locking in policies that were already in play, rather than initiating any new direction in Australia’s international outlook.

Carr noted that his approach to China was consistent with pre-existing policy of stronger engagement in trade while treading carefully on more controversial diplomatic and strategic issues. In this, Australia under Carr took a very careful line on China’s claims in the South China Sea, that the territorial disputes should be settled through a multilateral discussion.

Such an approach was diplomatically inoffensive, but not one that China was ever likely to take much notice of.

Australia’s other main achievement under Carr was its securing of a seat on the United Nations Security Council, the bid for which had been put in place by Carr’s predecessor, Kevin Rudd, when he was foreign minister. Again, this was consistent with his "continuity" approach.

Carr did claim, in announcing his resignation from the Senate, that he was pleased to have presided over "improved relations with the Arab world". While Australia has had slightly closer engagement with a number of Arab states, it is difficult to see any significant improvement in relations.

The so-called "Arab Spring" has led to more chaos than order and very little democracy. Australia’s role in any of that has been at the margins, primarily as an onlooker.

Carr’s main advantage as foreign minister was his erudite and somewhat urbane personal outlook. These well complemented his top Australian diplomatic role, helping to present a somewhat more sophisticated Australian face to the world than had previously been available, or deserved.

Had he more time, perhaps Carr would have been one of Australia’s better foreign ministers. But 18 months in office is too short a tenure other than to do exactly what he did, which was keep the seat warm and not make any mistakes.

Carr will now use his "dozen PhDs" of learning as a professorial fellow at the University of Sydney.

Provocation Law Change in NSW could be lethal

This article was first published on The Sydney Morning Herald website on 22 October 2013. 

The O'Farrell government must reconsider their recommendation to retain a restricted version of the controversial partial defence of provocation.

The government has released a draft exposure bill recommending reform of a partial defence that has long attracted criticism and community concern. Under the proposed reform, the defence will be significantly restricted and will be renamed the "partial defence of extreme provocation".

Why England must abolish the mandatory life sentence for murder

An article published this week in the latest issue of Criminology and Criminal Justice reveals judicial and legal practitioner support for the abolition of the mandatory life sentence in the English criminal justice system. This blog post provides an overview of the research findings, access the full article here

Sugar-sweetened drinks: public enemy number one for weight gain

The evidence linking sugar-sweetened drinks and weight gain has been growing for many years. Now the most comprehensive review to date has firmly laid the blame for these drinks as being a major culprit for weight gain.

Drinking too many drinks high in sugar is clearly not a good thing to do if someone was concerned about their weight. Both the kilojoule content and also the fact that it comes in liquid form which gives less of a feeling of fullness compared to solid food are likely reasons why drinking too much of them can cause weight gain.

After many years of accumulating solid observational evidence linking sugar-sweetened drinks to weight gain, supported by randomised controlled trials, there is now a clear case for cutting back on the consumption of these drinks.

Australia as a 'pivotal power', or just a middle one?

From his output, ASPI’s Anthony Bergin likes nothing if not to test ideas in relation to Australia’s strategic positioning. His recent proposition that Australia is not so much a ‘middle power’ but a ‘pivotal power’ is a case in point . http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/is-australia-a-pivotal-power/

Bergin’s argument is that the common strategic descriptor for Australia as a ‘middle power’ does not accurately reflect its military size or capability, the size of its economy or its strategic reach. In each of these he is correct.
However, the term ‘pivotal power’ is complex. One understanding has it meaning more than just being relatively strategically strong. Indeed, Oxford Analytica defines it not as a quantitative assessment of strategic power but as being a geographic arbiter.http://www.oxan.com/analysis/dailybrief/pivotalpowers/default.aspx

Australia relative to Turkey, as Bergin notes, classifies them both as middle powers. But Turkey’s role with its neighbours, particularly Syria, Iraq and Israel, also mark it as a key regional actor and it is, thus, also considered to be a pivotal power. Closer to home, Indonesia occupies an arbitrating role in the ASEAN regions as well as in relations with Timor-Leste and Australia.
By comparison, Australia is a regional strategic power in the Southwest Pacific, but perhaps less so than it has been. In part this is due to the increasing sense of independence of some of the Pacific island states. In part it is also due to the more active soft power role being played by China in the region, which in turn buttresses this sense of independence – at least from Australia.
Timor-Leste, though geographically close to Australia and a major recipient of Australian aid and, at times, military assistance, has carved an increasingly independent path. If one can define Timor-Leste’s foreign policy, it is one of having a number of strong friends, so that it remains cosseted by some should relations with one turn sour.
Australia’s status in Timor-Leste has diminished, while that of Indonesia has increased. Timor-Leste’s police now train with Indonesian police, and there is an agreement that their armed forces also train together. Australia provides training to, but it does not train with, Timor-Leste’s defence force.
Australia’s strategic status is, on balance, perhaps slightly stronger, or perceived as such, than it has been, given its active participation in recent multilateral conflicts and as a preferred site for training by regional military officers. In another sense, in a strategic environment always in a state of flux, the precise status of any state will remain variable and, more to the point, interpretable.
But if Australia was to suddenly disappear from the strategic stage, the question is the extent to which it might matter. Bergin may be correct and Australia is indeed a pivotal state, if in its own peculiar way.

Why disaster insurance should be on the G20 agenda

Australia has an unprecedented opportunity to resolve issues of escalating insurance prices caused by an uncertain climate. The time has come to curb the trend towards increased economic exposure to natural catastrophes.

The recent change of government, the upcoming Australian G20 in Brisbane in 2014, the establishment of the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Research Centre and international support from APEC finance ministers all point towards support for research and action for disaster risk financing.

Disaster risk financing is defined as strategies and instruments used to manage the financial impact of disasters. Disaster risk financing can use mechanisms like budgetary reallocation, debt financing, increased taxation or international aid. Or there are ex ante mechanisms, such as government reserves, insurance, contingent credit or catastrophe-linked securities.

The impetus to develop this kind of financing in Australia has its basis in a number of reports outlining existing inadequacies, including the Victorian Royal Commission final report into the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires and the Natural Disaster Insurance Review in the wake of Queensland’s floods and and Cyclone Yasi. Subsequent reports have affirmed the need for insurance in Australia to be the “key instrument that supports any efforts to maximise national resilience”.

Research abounds concerning the need to implement preferable solutions to the increasing number of catastrophic events, particularly in relation to improving access and affordability of insurance products. Insurance can play a pivotal role in the financial component of disaster risk management, reducing the financial, fiscal and economic impact of disasters as well as promoting faster disaster recovery."...

https://theconversation.com/why-disaster-insurance-should-be-on-the-g20-...

The ties that bind are also the ties that blind

The two trips by Prime Minister Tony Abbott to Indonesia have started to give a distinctive shape to a shift in Australian foreign policy. In keeping with Abbott's assertive political style, Australia is on the diplomatic front foot, promoting his pro-Asia policy agenda.

But the forcefulness of the way in which this agenda is being pushed may leave Australia exposed to uncomfortable outcomes. We generally have good regional relationships, but the interests of our neighbours are not necessarily the same as our own interests.

Abbott's overture to China to reach a free trade agreement within 12 months is ambitious and intended to secure a long-term economic relationship with our largest trading partner. Similarly, Abbott's unambiguous message to Indonesia is that Australia will be an even more loyal friend, with less tolerance for dissent around human rights issues.

Both cases are intended to secure different aspects of Australia's national interest and being the diplomatic initiator signals Australia's positive intentions. But initiating the further development of relationships then requires that gesture be taken up by the counterpart country.

In both cases, Abbott's eagerness gives China and Indonesia greater scope for setting the terms of the relationship. Australia thus becomes the supplicant, with China and Indonesia bestowing the favours.

By placing a 12-month timeline on a free trade agreement with China, Abbott has signalled a willingness to accept previously problematic Chinese conditions. These include investments in Australia by Chinese state-owned enterprises, a lower threshold for scrutiny by the Foreign Investment Review Board, and allowing more Chinese workers into Australia.

China's plan is to secure for itself continuing access to resources over the longer term, and to do so at a good price. Its foreign direct investments, including in Australia, achieve both those goals. Similarly, the greater its direct control over resources, the stronger its bargaining position over those resources that it does not directly control.

Abbott's recent visit to Jakarta reaffirmed Australia's commitment to Indonesia's territorial integrity. In this he was, perhaps, even more insistent than his predecessors.

In significant part this reflects the deep concern that Indonesia had with the Coalition's policy of returning asylum seeker boats to Indonesia and attendant plans to pay locals for intelligence on boat departures. That signature policy in opposition now looks to be in the process of being quietly abandoned in government, replaced by a slightly stronger version of the existing policy of bilateral co-operation.

But part of Abbott's ''total respect'' for Indonesia's territorial sovereignty and integrity was code for endorsing the status quo in the territory of West Papua. This has played out recently with the return of seven West Papuan asylum seekers to Papua New Guinea and the ''voluntary'' departure of three West Papuan protesters from the Australian Consulate-General in Bali.

The seven returned to PNG would likely have qualified for refugee status had they been processed in the usual manner. Despite what could be fairly understood as a plea for asylum, the three are now in hiding from the Indonesian police.

The drivers for Abbott's foreign policy push are not explicit. But they can be divined from his political history. Abbott is a classical free trader, pursuing a policy in which markets are self-regulating and find their own equilibrium. An open door policy towards trade with and investment from China fits perfectly into this framework.

On Indonesia, one can detect a sensibility that reflects the strong pro-Indonesia (and anti-communist) position of his political training ground in the National Civic Council. At the time, this included opposition to East Timor's independence, and West Papua's continued incorporation.

Three decades on, Australia's interests in Indonesia are more complex. Indonesia's economy is growing, soon to overtake Australia's in total size, and it is in both countries' interests to seek and develop economic complementarities.

But Indonesia is potentially also a major strategic and diplomatic partner for Australia. It provides Australia with entree into ASEAN and can help facilitate some of its wider regional interests. How Indonesia views Australia has major implications for Australia's strategic positioning.

The relatively benign relationship that Australia has enjoyed with Indonesia over much of the past decade can be attributed to the reformist, pro-Western preferences of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, within a year, Yudhoyono will leave office. Abbott's commitment to Indonesia is unlikely to change, but the successor may be more assertively nationalistic. This could include requiring Australia to even more strongly oppose West Papuan activism, despite the conflict this will engender with more pro-human rights sections of Australian society.

China, too, will ultimately be concerned over its own interests and much less those of Australia. Local discomfort, if of a different type, may have to be accepted in the push and shove of competing understandings over what a more open economic relationship might entail.

The conventional approach to diplomatic relations is to take them slowly, consider their implications deeply and to proceed cautiously. This does not, however, accord with Abbott's political style.

Abbott's international agenda is appearing to be about achieving much quickly. In his rush, however, such enthusiasm for making agreements and pushing policy on the run may miss some of the implications, much less the nuances, embedded in the detail.

Australia needs stronger international linkages, not least with major trading and strategic partners. But it does not need such arrangements at any price. No agreement is better than a bad agreement.

A more cautious and considered approach to international relations will produce results less quickly. But they may be results that Australia is more easily able to live with, with fewer negative consequences, over the longer term.

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