In response to a number of highly publicised events where people from minority religious, ethnic or other cultural backgrounds have been approached on public transport and subjected to a tirade of racist abuse in Melbourne, columnist Tim Soutphommasane wrote in The Age earlier this month that while racism cannot be entirely eradicated from society, it is time that onlookers confronted acts of public racism as a matter of civic responsibility.
The 10-year anniversary of the Iraq war serves as a unique opportunity to measure the costs of the intervention, to assess the successes and failures of the goals of the war and to assess Australia’s obligations.
Let’s start with the costs. According to official figures, 4486 US military and 319 other coalition troops died during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which cost US taxpayers $806 billion. No reliable public estimate exists on how much the war cost the Australian taxpayer. In Iraq the cost was much higher. Although estimates vary on the exact figures, approximately 162,000 Iraqis have died and an untold number injured. The war has also resulted in around 1.24 million internally displaced people and 1.6 million refugees, and many people have migrated out of Iraq since 2003.
The leak of the so-called "Kissinger Cables" has shown that while the US expected Indonesia would invade what was then Portuguese Timor in 1975, it did not wish to be implicated in the affair. A cable dated August 16, 1975 said that the US' "only secret" regarding Portuguese Timor was its desire not to become involved.
The cable stated that while Indonesia's "incorporation" of Portuguese Timor would be the outcome most "beneficial" for locals and the most likely to ensure regional stability, the "decision … is not for us to make, and we are determined not to become involved in the process". The cable noted that if Indonesia used aggression in the incorporation, it could have negative repercussions for military support for Indonesia.
The cable appears to show little understanding of events in Portuguese Timor at this time, given that the local UDT party, influenced by Indonesian disinformation, had attempted to stage a coup on August 10. By August 16, Fretilin forces had all but defeated the UDT and its pro-Indonesia Apodeti allies.
Perhaps the most importand aspect of the leaked cable is that it confirms the expectation of Indonesia's invasion, more than two weeks before another leaked cable, on September 4, 1975, said that Indonesia's then acting foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, acting on behalf of president Suharto, had proposed that Australia join with Indonesia, Portugal and Malaysia in sending UN-sanctioned peace-keeping troops to oversee Portuguese Timor’s decolonisation. The cable says the Australian embassy in Jakarta had responded negatively to the suggestion, given that then prime minister Gough Whitlam had previously refused to consider such an overture from Portugal.
By September 4, UDT and Apodeti forces had been defeated and already retreated across the border into West Timor, where they were re-organising with the support of -- and as a front for -- the Indonesian military. By September 4, too, Australia almost certainly knew that the Indonesian proposal was intended to obscure its intention to invade Portuguese Timor. It was already known by Australian diplomats that Indonesia's military intelligence had been fomenting a disinformation campaign about the dominant Fretilin party since earlier in the year, and promoting its local front party, Apodeti.
A Jakarta think-tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, closely linked to the Indonesian military and the generals who later led the invasion, had already drawn up plans for Portuguese Timor's "integration" into Indonesia. The CSIS had close relations with Australia's ambassador to Jakarta, Richard Woollcott, who in August 1975 recommended that Australia should accept the inevitability of the impending Indonesian invasion.
Whitlam had told parliament on 2 September that no definite proposal for including Australian peace-keepers had been put which, at this stage, was correct. The cable, however, reveals a more nuanced and considered response from Whitlam than has previously been portrayed by what appeared to be his acquiescence to, if not promotion of, Indonesia’s takeover of Portuguese Timor. A September 3 cable says that Australia could consider humanitarian assistance to Portuguese Timor, which Indonesia had earlier rejected. But it showed Whitlam would not countenance anything that had a "colonial character", such as sending troops.
Whitlam's concern at this time reflected the method of Indonesia's incorporation of West Papua in 1969, through a much-criticised show of hands by 1025 hand-picked tribal leaders. It also reflected Whitlam's support for the subsequent "Barwick Doctrine" of Australia not involving itself in prolonging unsustainable colonial arrangements.
The leaked cables add detail to understanding the events that led to Indonesia’s invasion of Portuguese Timor, which had unofficially begun in early October 1975 and officially on December 8. Most notably, they show how poor much US information was on relevant events at this time.
Almost four decades later, and more than a decade after Timor-Leste "restored" its independence, the cables are an awkward footnote to the now surprising closeness of relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia.
The memory of what we believe we have eaten in a recent meal is now considered an important part of regulating our appetite and hunger.
What drives us to desire food is a complex mix of hormones, psychology and physiology. One new research frontier being explored is how our recent memory of what we have eaten (termed episodic memory) can modify future food intake.
Myanmar's reform program is being challenged by continuing anti-Muslim rioting, which has left 43 dead and hundreds injured in the past two weeks. The rioting has now extended beyond Rakhine State across central Myanmar (formerly Burma), with "well-organised" anti-Muslim riots in 11 Burmese cities and towns, including its second city of Mandalay, where a state of emergency has been declared, and to Pegu, just north of Rangoon.
Security forces have been accused of being unable or unwilling to control the rioting. Although Myanmar has long had a history of religious intolerance, there are also concerns the riots are being organised by factions opposed to the country's recent reforms. The anti-Muslim rioting by Buddhist nationalist extremists started in Rakhine State last December, where it left more than 180 dead. There have been reports of extremist Buddhists from Sri Lanka working with counterparts in Myanmar to promote a radical, religious-based, nationalist agenda. Burmese and Sri Lankan Buddhist communities have long had close ties, with Sri Lanka's extremist Buddhists at the forefront of Sri Lanka's increasingly authoritarian turn.
The United Nations' human rights envoy to Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana, says the reluctance of security forces to crack down on the unrest suggests a possible state link to the fighting. "I have received reports of state involvement in some of the acts of violence, and of instances where the military, police and other civilian law enforcement forces have been standing by while atrocities have been committed before their very eyes," he said. "This may indicate direct involvement by some sections of the state or implicit collusion and support for such actions."
A government spokesman has denied state involvement in the riots. President Thein Sein, who has instituted many of Myanmar's recent reforms, has warned he would use force if necessary to protect lives and property from the violence. He has said "political opportunists and religious extremists" have been involved in orchestrating the anti-Muslim violence.
While there is some possibility that religious extremists are taking advantage of Myanmar's increasing openness to press for a form of ethnic cleansing, there continues to be a military faction in the country's government opposed to its reform program. The anti-reform group has consistently been on the back foot over the past year, being replaced in senior government posts by pro-reform officers. However, the rise of religious violence has bolstered an anti-reform nationalist agenda.
Thein Sein has responded to the riots by convening a high-powered "committee" to identify and "take severe action" against the organisers of the riots. The "committee" is headed by Myanmar's Minister for Home Affairs, Lt. General Ko Ko, Aung Min (Thein Sein's "fix-it" minister without portfolio) and chief of police Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Tun.
As we are about to head into the annual chocolate gorging season, a timely post on all things chocolate. Chocolate is a food that brings immense pleasure and enjoyment to people and can be a part of any person’s regular diet. It's sweet, it's tasty, we desire it and crave it. And in case you were looking for any more valid reasons to eat it, no, you haven’t been lied to by the media, scientists confirm that it can be good for you.
How chocolate is made
Chocolate is made from cocoa beans which grow on Cacao trees. The cocoa bean is roasted and ground to make cocoa liquor (cocoa mass) which has a fat content of about 50% (as cocoa butter). The cocoa butter can be removed which leaves behind a solid powder (cocoa powder).
Milk chocolate has milk and sugar added to a blend of cocoa powder and cocoa butter, but has less cocoa content than dark chocolate.
The release of Australian hostage Warren Rodwell after being held hostage for the past 15 months has provided a lucky ending to hostage-taking in the southern Philippines. In a region that has had perhaps the world's most consistently high kidnapping rate for the past couple of decades, it is an especially rare outcome for a kidnapping allegedly by the Abu Sayyaf Group.
The ASG is notorious for executing its hostages if ransoms are not paid quickly. That Rodwell has been released with a payment believed to be less than 5% of the original demand of $2 million suggests that while he was indeed kidnapped, it was not by the ASG as claimed.
On Saturday morning, Rodwell was put in a boat near the town of Pagadian City and told to "paddle for your life" following the payment of what is believed to have been a little more than A$90,000. While the ASG claims an Islamist rationale and has engaged in bombings and other terrorist attacks in the Philippines, its principle method of operation has been kidnappings for ransom.
The ASG has developed a fearsome reputation for executing hostages, often by beheading, if ransoms are not paid quickly in full. This has led some counter-terrorism experts to suggest that either the ASG has "gone soft" or, more likely, the group that kidnapped Rodwell was not ASG.
"A lot of us agree that something about this whole affair does not sit right," one CT expert said shortly after Rodwell's "proof of life" video last December. He said at that time that if Rodwell were released, "he would be one of the longest foreigners ever held captive by the ASG, for the least amount of money in their sordid history".
It was noted at that time Rodwell looked relatively well, clean-shaven and did not have a gun at his head, which had been used in videos of other ASG hostages.
The Zamboanga peninsula on the island of Mindanao has for a couple of decades had a reputation as consistently the worst place for kidnapping in the world. As well as three armed separatist organisations operating in the region -- ASG, the MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front -- there are also elements of the communist New Peoples' Army and numerous freelance kidnapping gangs, all of which have competed with each other to kidnap people most likely able to pay ransom.
The ASG does not generally operate on mainland Mindanao but in the Sulu Archipelago. That Rodwell was released in an area well outside of the ASG's operational zone indicates it is likely he was abducted by a smaller kidnap gang which claimed that it was ASG in order to stimulate action on the part of parties that might consider paying a ransom for his release.
But even if Rodwell was not kidnapped by the ASG, he was lucky to have had a deal struck on his behalf to be freed. While the ASG's name may have been taken in vain, the region remains intensely dangerous, with foreigners in particular being victims of choice for kidnappers, with outcomes that are often less successful than Rodwell's.
We will never know, now, what inspired Ben Zygier to become a spy. His death, probably by suicide but who will ever really know, has put an end to that.
Plenty of red-blooded individuals who have watched one spy movie too many or been intrigued by a Le Carre novel have fantasised about becoming a spy, in much the same way that soldiers joined the army in the Great War in search of adventure; they had little or no idea what they were getting into.
Zygier chose to become an Israeli citizen in the mid-1990s, and to apply to Israel's principle intelligence agency Mossad in 2004. By the time he had completed training, he would have been aware of the less glamorous reality that occupied about 99% of intelligence.
Being an intelligence agent is overwhelmingly about gathering information, usually from quite pedestrian sources, or analysing that information. Occasionally there is scope for obtaining secret information, but that comprises a very small piece in the intelligence jigsaw puzzle.
There is also a small operational branch of most intelligence agencies, who engage in hostage rescue or, very rarely, covert attacks. These agents are commonly former special forces soldiers or special operations police. There is limited overlap between operational agents and information gathering agents.
Fairfax's ex-Middle East correspondent Jason Koutsoukis reveals more fascinating details today. Zygier's first significant assignment was to infiltrate a company with links in countries that were hostile to Israel. As with much intelligence gathering, it was relatively dull work. Being a good spy, however, requires focused attention to even the dullest detail, which is where the occasional gems of information might lie.
But Zygier lacked that focus and the greater purpose of his role. He was sacked from his public position and recalled by Mossad to a desk job. That was where fantasy and reality collided.
Wanting to return to field work, Zygier initiated an unauthorised plan to gather information from a Hezbollah operative. As is convention, he had to establish his own bona fides and, in doing so, became the pawn in the more experienced Hezbollah operative's game. Zygier gave away extremely valuable information, in exchange for nothing. Two Mossad informants in Hezbollah was subsequently arrested and jailed. The only surprise there is that they were not summarily executed.
Regardless of his intentions, Zygier had crossed an un-crossable line; he had made a mistake from which one does not recover. That he was also jailed was testament to Mossad's essential internal fairness. Many other organisations would simply have made Zygier "disappear". In any case, Zygier faced an extended jail term, a bleak future in Israel and the end of whatever dreams he might have had.
There is, then, little motive for Zygier's death to have been other than self-inflicted. But if it was otherwise that, too, would be of little surprise. Clearly there was little sense of loss by Zygier's guards at his death.
The lesson in this, if one was needed, is that intelligence work, while critically necessary, is often dull, poorly rewarded, with little glamour and usually no action. People who want to become spies are usually the least suited to the task.
The best spies are quiet, nerdy detail-freaks who have little appetite for drama or action and who are usually tapped on the shoulder, rather than volunteering. Zygier did not fit this mould and, for this poor fit, he ultimately ended up dead.
Losing weight is hard, but holding onto hard fought gains can be even harder. Weight regain is faced by almost all successful weight losers, resulting in the need to turn to yet another variation of the dieting, exercising and self-denial merry-go-round ride.
Weight regain is well described in the medical literature, but the reasons for it are not entirely clear. Plateauing of weight loss and a subsequent drop in motivation to keep up the changes in diet and exercise changes certainly play an important role.
Australian researchers have added a new piece to the puzzle of weight regain, by studying how the hormones that drive us to eat and make us feel full can change after a period of weight loss.