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All Under the Family’s Control?

Saturated fat not linked to heart disease? Not so fast, the real message behind the headlines

Many of you would have come across today's 'hot topic' in the media citing a just published meta-analysis showing little link between saturated fat and heart disease.

I really feel for the public in being faced with such conflicting nutrition messages. I could blame no one for throwing their hands up in despair, proclaiming that all nutrition health messages are rubbish as they reach for the salami stick and deep fried Mars Bar.

But hold on for just one moment before you take that first bite. Saturated fat was never, repeat never, proclaimed as the big villain for heart disease. It was one of a whole range of diet and lifestyle habits including smoking, obesity, inactivity, and a poor diet overall, that together add to a person’s risk.

Dietary advice to reduce heart disease risk was never just about cutting back on saturated fat, it was cutting back on saturated fat as WELL AS eating less processed foods, salt, and sugar, and eating more fruit and vegetables. As a population, Australians have made little shift in making these type of inherently healthy eating changes permanent.

You can eat a diet high in saturated fat that is healthy, or you could eat less saturated fat and replace it with processed carbohydrates and sugar. These types of changes can’t always be seen in many of the studies that went into this latest research.

Dietary patterns consistently linked to lower rates of heart disease as well as longer-term health and longevity are almost universally low in saturated fat, yet also high in plant based foods, and fibre, and low in salt and sugar.

The nutrition profession as a whole (which includes me) is guilty of focussing too much on single nutrients as being health saviours or villains. But we don’t eat nutrients, we eat foods.

The positive news out of this latest conflicting research is that it sees more and more nutrition researchers are waking up to the risk of only focussing on nutrients, and instead look at whole diets.

Our latest Dietary Guidelines in fact have been framed much more in terms of foods, and less focus is given to nutrients.

Get the foods right, and the nutrients take care of themselves.

A sclerotic Malaysian government stumbles in MH370 crisis

If times of crisis show the true mettle of a government, Malaysians must be wondering about their government’s response to missing Malaysian Airlines flight MH370.
After decades of working with a tightly controlled media and, overwhelmingly, getting a very easy run, the Malaysian government has been asked to answer hard questions by unbowed journalists.
The Malaysian government is used to passing over issues without question, much less challenge, by local media (online media, such as Malaysiakini, is the exception). But over the past several days the struggling Malaysian government has been looking increasingly inept. It would be a laughing stock, but that this is no laughing matter.
At one level, government spokespeople have contradicted each other, often within hours, about the status of the plane, what could have happened to it and what the likely scenarios are. At another, more basic level, they appear wholly unable to gather clear and hard information and to present it coherently.
The government was initially slow to report that the plane was missing at all. It then took days to announce that military radar had determined that the plane had doubled back on its course.
Transport Minister Hishammuddin Hussein (pictured), who has been the government’s public face on the issue, said that his handling of the MH370 issue was "above politics". Yet the government has "outed" opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim by saying that he is related (distantly, by marriage) to the pilot of the missing plane, Captain Zaharie Ahmad Shah. The implication is that there was some connection between the plane’s disappearance and the government’s trumped-up sodomy conviction against the opposition leader.
Yet when French journalist Carrie Nooten asked Hishammuddin if he was being protected for his incompetence as a result of being the cousin of the Prime Minister, Najib Razak, she received a barrage of criticism from the pro-government Star newspaper.
Hishammuddin has been criticised internationally for saying the police had gone to the home of the pilot of the missing plane, even though they did not go to the pilot’s home until several days after the acting minister made this statement. He also raised doubts about the plane’s communications systems being switched off, even though that information had been confirmed.
The Chinese government is also dismayed by the Malaysian government’s inability to provide timely information. China’s official Xinhua News Agency said the delay "smacks of either dereliction of duty or reluctance to share information".
When a foreign journalist on Monday asked about criticism over slow and confused information, Hishammuddin said it was baseless. "I have got a lot of feedback saying we’ve been very responsible in our actions," he said, then went on the attack: "It’s very irresponsible of you to say that."
The government is also refusing to share what information it has about the missing plane with the opposition. Opposition members were not invited to an update briefing on the investigation on Tuesday, yet government parliamentarians were invited. A government MP told the opposition they should not question the minister’s "prerogative" on the matter of invitations. He said opposition MPs had not been invited because they would release the information via social media.
In an information vacuum, and fuelled by the government’s ill-informed ramblings, rumour and speculation has taken the place of hard information.
The Malaysia media has recently reported everything from the plane having burst into flames mid-flight, crashed in the ocean, been hijacked by the crew or others, landed on a remote airstrip, flown in the shadow of another plane, and being seen over the Maldives. Even that doyen of accurate reporting, Rupert Murdoch, has been twittering into the void: 'World seems transfixed by 777 disappearance. Maybe no crash but stolen, effectively hidden, perhaps in northern Pakistan, like Bin Laden.'
The Malaysian government’s incompetence is now playing out as an election issue in a byelection in the town of Kajang in Selangor state on Malaysia’s central west coast. Ibrahim’s wife, Wan Azizah, is a PKR (People’s Justice Party) candidate in that election. Kajang is currently held by the PKR.
In its five decades in power, assisted by rigging electoral boundaries, the Malaysian government has rarely been held to account, much less scrutiny. It is not used to addressing questions directly or, sometimes, honestly. However in recent years its grip on power has weakened.
The MH370 crisis has shown how sclerotic the otherwise comfortable Malaysian government has become.

A view to lead India: who are the candidates?

India will go to the polls from April 5 to May 12 to choose between three party leaders for its next prime minister. The first is a seasoned politician and three-time chief minister, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP, or Indian People’s Party) Narendra Modi.

Obesity can reshape our sense of taste

As surprising as it may sound, for some people the problem of weight gain may lie right on the tip of their tongue.

There are many things that can influence a person’s desire for food. When given a choice between foods, the desire to choose one food over another is closely linked to taste and other sensory signals such as smell and the feel of the food in the mouth.

A very simple hypothesis posed by obesity researchers is that as people gain weight, their taste perception changes. This theory is supported by studies in both animals and humans and suggest that obese people may not detect sweet tastes as well as their lean counterparts. This partly could be because of genetic factors, but also from changes in taste sensitivity as people gain weight.

Crimea vote: Russia's big win, but what now for Ukraine?

Lining up with death and taxes, the outcome of the weekend’s vote in Crimea on whether or not to join Russia was certain before the event. Somewhat remarkably -- with about two-thirds of Crimea’s population being ethnic Russian and the other third being openly opposed to joining Russia -- the vote to join Russia was said to be running in excess of 90%.
While the outcome of the vote may have reflected reluctance by non-Russians to vote in a referendum that was a foregone conclusion, it also -- at least in part -- continued to confirm doubts about the veracity of the result. Foreign journalists had been largely cleared from Crimea before the vote and no independent ballot monitors were allowed.
The referendum was marked by the extremity of the pro-Russia propaganda. Billboards told Crimean citizens that the choice was between Crimean voting for becoming Russian or becoming Nazi. This was in reference to about 10% of Ukraine’s parliament comprising far-right or neo-Nazi party representatives.
The referendum question, too, was whether Crimeans wished to join Russia immediately, or if they wished to be independent, leaving open the option of joining Ukraine at a later date. That Crimea is currently a part of Ukraine was not identified in the referendum.
But backed by Russian troops on the ground and Russian naval ships blockading the strategic port at Sevastapol, the question of nuance over language was only one of a litany of critical problems facing the technically unconstitutional referendum.
The real question now is whether Russia acts to incorporate Ukarine, as passed by its own Parliament two weeks ago. The alternative is that Russia’s President Valdimir Putin could use the vote in favour of unity with Russia to further pressure Ukraine into "voluntarily" turning away from the European Union and returning to the Russian economic camp.
With an estimated 60,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders too, and considerable dissent and pro-Russian sympathy in eastern Ukraine, the government in Kiev will be disinclined to try to wrestle back control of Crimea by military means. At best, this would spark a civil war, which would leave Ukraine divided. At worst it would lead to a Russian invasion, which Ukraine would not be able to stop.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government's friends in the West remain conflicted on what action to take over Russia's heavy-handedness in Crimea. Germany in particular is taking a softer line on proposed economic sanctions than other EU countries.
Economic sanctions are likely. This then plays into the hands of the Kremlin’s hard-liners, who have long been in favour of a split with the West. Instead, they are seeking to strengthen ties with an increasingly powerful China. Some even want a deliberately confrontational relationship with the West, by way of reasserting Russia’s status as a power worthy of the world’s attention.
United States Secretary of State John Kerry says he still hopes for a compromise arrangement with President Putin, in a bid to resolve the Ukraine crisis. The difficulty with this is, increasingly, there is no mood in Moscow for a deal. In any case, as Russians will tell you, in Russian there is no equivalent for the English word "compromise".
In linguistic theory there is, broadly, a view that the language that is available defines one’s ability to conceptualise -- if the word does not exist then neither does the corresponding idea. If this leaves what English speakers might regard as a gap in how Russians thereby understand the world, they might take even less comfort from the further fact that, in Russian, there are seven different words for "enemy".

ASADA, the AFL and WADA - The Main Game

Jokowi now cleared to run to the finish line as Indonesia's next president

In the race for the Indonesian presidential elections in July, Joko ‘Jokowi' Widodo has just been nominated as PDI-P's presidential candidate. This follows a decision by former president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to shelve her own plans for an unlikely comeback to support the long-standing front-runner.
The 52 year old Jokowi is streets ahead of the nearest contender, former Kopassus chief and ex-Sunarto son-in-law Prabowo Subianto. Opinion polls show Jokowi consistently running at between double and triple Prabowo’s potential vote, with more than a third of the electorate favouring Jokowi in the first presidential round. Translated into a second round vote, Jokowi should, on current numbers, win the presidency in a landslide.
Having said that, Indonesia’s presidential elections are not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, nothing is a foregone conclusion in politics. But Jokowi would now have to make a serious error not to have a fairly easy run to the finish line.
Such challenges that the preferred presidential candidate now face will come after the elections, not before. The challenges that Jokowi will face will be principally around economic policy - he doesn't have any, yet Indonesia desperately needs to start charting a clear course if its economy is to reach anything like its potential.
Related to this, there remains a big question as to how Jokowi will handle Indonesia's economic rise, assuming it happens as predicted, and its parallel rise as a strategic power. The choices he will face are whether to continue to be inwardly focused and not assert Indonesia's increasingly important role in the region, or to look outwards and make Indonesia a more active international player.
On balance, one would say he will likely remain a conservative, or a minimalist, on foreign policy. Indonesia’s economy, on the other hand, could certainly benefit from clear economic direction, but Jokowi can be expected to be fairly hands off, with his default position tending towards nationalist or protectionist policies.
Beyond that, at this stage of the political game, there is not a great deal the others can do to 'steal' Jokowi's limelight. In Javanese culture, power accrues through perceived lack of action, or discreet action, rather than through overt action.
The more Jokowi’s main rivals, Prabowo and Golkar’s Aburizal Bakri, act, the more they will be seen as 'kasar' or coarse and over-reaching. Jokowi only need be himself to continue his good run of luck and the sense of charisma that appears to build based in his populist but not assertive appearances.
Jokowi is often portrayed as a ‘man of the people’, and he can claim to be closer to the ‘wong cilik’ (little people) than most of the political elite. Indeed, so much invested in Jokowi’s populism that he is seen to represent a clean break with the corruption and money politics that has dominated Indonesia in its post-Suharto period.
Yet in Indonesia, it is all but impossible to be successful in business, as Jokowi was in his home town of Surakarta, without at least flirting with corruption. That he has been a successful politician, first in his home town and then as Governor of Jakarta, perhaps speaks more to his engagement outside the main players in Indonesia’s oligarchy, rather than his complete removal from the world of patronage and favors.
The only possible problem that Jokowi would now face in his run to the presidential finish line will be if there is a critical issue between now and the election that Jokowi is unable to respond to adequately, and if his facade consequently crumbles, His charisma might then quickly crumble.
This close to the elections, though, it would have to be a dramatic issue and an equally dramatic collapse to have any real impact. All Jokowi need do is react little and he would be sufficiently politically preserved to use his electoral buffer to get across the line.
If one was to lay a bet, one would have to say that the odds are now very much stacked in favor of Jokowi becoming Indonesia’s next president. The next big question will be, once in office, how he will wield the still considerable authority the office holds, and whether he can stitch together a legislative majority to help ensure that whatever program he does try to implement will have some success of being passed into law.
Achieving office, in Indonesia, is one thing. Being able to do something with it to address the country's sense of drift is, however, quite another.

Cornered, the Russian bear likely to show its teeth in region

The immediacy of events in Ukraine, including the recent the pro-Ukranian demonstrations in Kiev and pro-Russian demonstrations in eastern Donetsk, have blinkered much understanding of the unfolding crisis to Moscow’s south. The triumphalism that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union left many Western observers blind to an underlying architecture predicated on Russia’s deeply felt need to never again be subject to a catastrophe like the "Great Patriotic War".
Between 1941 and 1945, over 26 million people, more than one in eight, died within Soviet borders. As with the Jewish Holocaust, this lesson has not been forgotten.
The Soviet Union and the post-Soviet core Russian state wanted to retain a buffer between the state and potential aggressors, as well as to neutralise potential enemies along its borders. This fits hand in glove with President Vladimir Putin’s plan for a Eurasian Union, in much the same way that the European Union was intended to neutralise long-term enmity between European states.
There is little doubt that the Russian media’s hyperbole over Ukraine’s neo-Nazis is vastly overblown, not least given the presence of neo-Nazis in Russia. Putin is himself sympathetic to "White Russian" philosopher Ivan Ilych. But that there remain members of Ukraine’s government with at least a neo-Nazi past remains genuinely troubling, both for Russia as well as a more moderate West.
In particular, the All Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" party, which has five members in cabinet, was created in the early post-Soviet era as the Social-National Party of Ukraine, intentionally mirroring the German Nazi National-Socialist Party name. Its defining characteristics were ethnic exclusivity, anti-Semitism, pronounced neo-Nazi rhetoric and, until 2003, the stylised neo-Nazi "wolf-hook" (wolfsangel) logo ...
However, by 2005, Svoboda had begun to purge its more extreme elements, broke with other European neo-Nazi groups and attempted to take on a more moderate hue. It has since clashed with other neo-Nazi groups, including the radical Right Sector at Euromaidan during the protests that toppled President Viktor Yanukovych.
Along with moderation came political success, with Svoboda’s vote increasing from a negligible proportion to around 10.4% in the 2012 elections. Some Ukranian neo-Nazi groups also had members elected as independents, although failed to gain inclusion in the new government.
That Ukrainian Nazis were key allies of German Nazis in World War II is not lost on Russian politicians. This then feeds into Russian concerns over what one former British diplomat posted to Moscow has referred to as its own "arc of instability", which ranges from Belarus bordering Poland to the west, Moldova and Ukraine to the south-east and the troubled Caucasus region of Abkhazia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Dagestan and the rest to the south and south-west.
Without its outer layer of the old Soviet bloc states to the west, unable to fully control otherwise independent former Soviet states and with ethnically distinct regions variously attempting to separate, Russia, in its darker moments, is afraid. This fear provokes a bombastic assertion, as if to ward off past nightmares.
In its more rational moments, Russia seeks future security through the Eurasia Union trading zone. But it remains brittle when challenged -- hence Russia’s intervention in the now less pliable Ukraine.
There is little economic value in creating Crimea as an internal part of the Russian state, and even its strategic value is less than it once was; Russia has other Black Sea bases. But this effective annexation is an assertion of regional dominance, which has been to date successful.
Assuming a continued lack of Ukranian compliance, Russia’s next step is likely to be "assisting" ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine also break away. The West will continue to protest, without a united voice.
But Russia’s "facts on the ground" are just that, and no one is going to war over Ukraine, probably including Ukrainians themselves.

How much does it cost to eat healthier?

The abundance and cheap cost of unhealthy food has meant that there is a perception that a healthy diet is one that costs more. A systematic review of direct cost comparisons between healthy and unhealthy diets has indeed found that a healthy diet does cost more, but the difference is smaller than you might think.

A healthy diet, loaded with plenty of fruits, vegetables, minimally processed foods and lean sources of protein is the cornerstone of reducing the risk of many chronic diseases. People from an economically disadvantaged background may find it harder to eat healthier if there is a real or perceived higher cost to eating healthier. It is no surprise that the highest density of fast-food outlets cluster in socially disadvantaged areas and on the surface, this type of food may appear to offer ‘value for money’ all other nutritional concerns aside.

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